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DECREE OF THE ROMAN ROTA 
CONCERNING A NEW PRESENTATION 
OF A CASE ON NULLITY OF MARRiAGE 
( lO.IV.1987) 
l. GRAMUNT 
The «Decree of Tum» that follows this brief introduction decides a 
pre-judicial, that is an incidental question conceming the new presentation 
of a marriage nullity case. The outline of the facts and the points of law. 
both procedural and substantial, which seem more relevant is a follows: 
THEFACTS 
1. On January 3, 1980, the Diocesan Tribunal declared a nullity of 
marriage; the Respondent appealed to the Metropolitan Tribunal on Jan-
uary 5th, but his appeal received no answers. 
2. On January 12, 1980, the Metropolitan Tribunal confrrmed the 
sentence of nullity issued by the first instance Tribunal. 
3. Not until November 13, 1980, did the Respondent appeal to the 
Apostolic Signatura on grounds that no response was made by the 
Diocesan Tribunal to his frrst appeal. The Signatura refered the case to the 
Roman Rota. Since the deadline for appeal had elapsed (cf. c. 1633), the 
Judge-Relator did not reply to the appeal. We infer that, eventually, the 
Rota Judge-Relator requested from the Respondent an account of the 
events of his dealings with the Diocesan Tribunal. 
4. When the account of the events was received in the Rota on July 
30 (six years later!), the Judge Relator proceeded to take the following 
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steps: a) To declare, by Decree of October 4, 1986, that the process was 
then abandoned (cf. ce. 1520-1522); b) To order, on October 7, 1986, 
the suspension of the peremption of the case (cf. c. 1644, § 2), presum-
ably to pave the way for the next step; e) To raise the «pre-judicial» 
(incidental) question on wether or not the case deserves a 'new examina-
tion, in view of the facts fmally available to the Roman court (cf. c. 1644 
§ 1). 
THELAW 
1. The question raised is said to be, properly speaking, a pre-judicial 
question because the nature of the dubium is such that, should the deci-
sion be affmnative, the principal case would have to be adjudged again; 
and if negative, there could no be a reopening. It is generally accepted, 
we may add, that an incidental question can be initiated by the parties 
(both private or public), the judge, or a third party with a legitimate inter-
est (cf. ce. 1452, 1587-1591). 
2. The law allows the reopening of cases related to the status of per-
sons even after two concordat sentences (cf. c. 1643)" but if the question 
itself is to be examined, new and significant proofs or arguments or doc-
uments are to be presented (cf. c. 1644, § 1). This rotal decision points 
out that new arguments can be intrinsic to the case itself when it can be 
show that there has been a violation of procedurallaw by evident neglect 
or, afortiori, a violation of the principIes inherently linked with the insti-
tution of marriage. 
THE ARGUMENf 
1. Arguing against the reopening of the case are the Promoter of 
Justice and the court-appointed Advocate of the Plaintiff; arguing for the 
reopening of the case are the Defender of the Bond and the court-ap-
pointed Advocate for the Defendant 
2. After due consideration of the arguments, the Rotal Tribunal con-
eludes: 
a. That the violations of procedurallaw on the part of both Diocesan 
and Metropolitan Tribunals were grave enough to arise legitimate suspi-
cion about the correct administration of justice. Even the frrst Rotal Rela-
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tor involved in the case is not exempted from criticism by the Roman 
court for his failure to acknowledge the appeal petition. 
b. While the formulation of the doubt in the second instance was 
confined to lack of due discretion, the sentence went beyond the doubt to 
include incapacity to as sume the essential obligations (cf. c. 1095), thus 
preventing the Respondent from making a legitimate defense against this 
new caput (cf.c. 1514). In addition, the capita were formulated by both 
Tribunals with ambiguous language and consequentIy, the Roman court 
concludes, that what is uncertain and undefmed cannot convey the force 
of certitude. 
c. The alleged lack of due discretion on the pan of both parties was 
not verified by the parties' depositions concerning their lives before mar-
riage, their period of engagement, the frrst seven years of their married 
life. The unhappy outcome of a conjugal union «is never in itself proof 
for demonstrating the incapacity of the contracting parties» (cf. John Paul 
lI, Address, February 6, 1987, n. 6). The Rotal decision goes on to say 
that only incapacity, and not difficulty cannot be confused with even re-
markabIe difficuIty. 
d. The evaluation of the psychiatrists, uncriticalIy and carelessly ac-
cepted by both TribunaIs, were based on certain views that are opposed 
to true Catholic Doctrine on marriage and to the principIes of Christian 
Anthropology (cf. John Paul 11 addresses of Febr. 6, 1987 and January, 
1988), thus vioIating principIes inherentIy linked with the institution of 
marriage. 
Decision: A new presentation of the case must be admiued. 
These are in our opinion, the relevant points of law that emerge from 
the sentence. 

